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EQUAL TO THE TASK? RE-EXAMINING EU EQUALITY
LAW IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Lisa Waddington'
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) concluded the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in December 2010, with the
Convention coming into force for the EU a month later, in January 2011. The
European Community, represented by the Commission, had previously played an
important role in the negotiation of the Convention, and the Community signed
the Convention in 2007. Following the conclusion of the Convention, the EU
is bound by the obligations therein to the extent of its competences. Amongst
the core principles of the CRPD are equality and non-discrimination, and these
find repeated references throughout the Convention. They are addressed in both
Article 3 CRPD (general principles) and Article 4 (general obligations), as well as
meriting 'first place' amongst the substantive provisions in Article 5, and frequent
explicit or implied reference in many of the remaining articles.
Combating discrimination on the grounds of disability is also a field that
falls within the competence of the EU. Article 10 Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) specifies that '[i]n defining and implementing its
policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on ...
disability' and Article 19 TFEU provides for the power to 'take appropriate action
to combat discrimination based on ... disability'. Moreover, secondary legislation,
prohibiting disability discrimination with regard to employment and vocational
training, was adopted even before the negotiations on the present Convention
commenced. The European Court of Justice has also rendered a number of
judgments in the context of disability and discrimination. Lastly, 2008 saw the
proposal by the Commission of a second directive addressing discrimination on
several grounds, including disability, and covering fields such as access to goods
and services, social security and social advantages.
The purpose of this article is to reflect on the possible implications for
European Union disability equality law resulting from the conclusion of the
1 European Disability Forum Chair in European Disability Law, Maastricht
University (NLs). This article was completed in April 2012 and does not take
account of subsequent developments. This article has been subject to independent
and anonymous peer review.
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CRPD by the EU. The article begins with a general examination of the legal
implications of the conclusion of the CRPD for the EU. This is followed by an
examination of both the CRPD provisions relating to non-discrimination and
equality, and EU law, including case law, in this field. The article concludes with
a reflection on the possible tensions between EU law and the CRPD with regard
to non-discrimination and equality, and the implications of the conclusion of the
CRPD for this particular area of EU law.
2. THE STATUS OF THE CRPD UNDER EU LAW
Many of the international agreements that the EU enters into, including the
CRPD, involve concurrent jurisdictions of both the Member States and the EU.
In the context of the CRPD the full range of competences of both the EU and the
Member States are engaged. Specifically, one of three, or possibly four, scenarios
can describe the respective competence of the EU and its Member States with
regard to individual provisions of the Convention. Namely: the EU has exclusive
competence to act; the Member States have exclusive competence to act; the EU
and the Member States share the competence to act; and lastly the EU can support
and supplement the action of the Member States.
The CRPD fields in which the EU has exclusive competence are fairly limited,
whilst a much broader set of fields fall within the areas of shared competence
with the Member States. Where the EU's competence to act is not exclusive,
including with regard to shared competences, the Member States remain free to
act collectively, individually or jointly with the Union to fulfil obligations under
international agreements.3
Following the adoption of the CRPD in 2006, the European Community (EC),
along with all of its Member States, quickly proceeded to sign the Convention.
The Council Decision4 on the signing of the Convention by the Community has,
as its legal basis both Articles 13 EC (now Article 19 TFEU) and 95 EC (now
Article 114 TFEU).5 The former article addresses combating discrimination on
the grounds of inter alia disability, whilst the latter covers the establishment and
functioning of the internal market. Article 13 EC had been previously referred
to in this context, being mentioned inter alia in both the 2003 Commission
Communication 'Towards a United Nations legally binding instrument to promote
and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities' 6 and the Opinion
2 Parts of this section are based on extracts from L. Waddington, 'The European
Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
A Story of Exclusive and Shared Competences', Maastricht Journal of European
and Comparative Law (2011), 431.
3 See Re: European Development Fund, Case C-316/91 European Parliament v.
Council [1994] ECR 1-625.
4 Council Decision (EC) on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 20 March
2007, 7407/07.
5 A third legal basis was Article 300(2) EC. This Article addresses the procedure to be
followed when the Community makes agreements with international organizations.
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
of 24 January 2003, 'Towards a United Nations legally binding instrument to
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of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication," although this
was the first explicit reference to the internal market provision in Community
documents on the Convention.
Whilst the intention and commitment of the EC to conclude the Convention
was clear, the timeline according to when this would happen was not. Although
no official statement or decision was made, there was speculation that the
Community would wait until all 27 Member States had ratified the Convention
before following suit.' However, this did not prove to be the case. In November
2009 the Council adopted a Decision concerning the conclusion, by the European
Community, of the CRPD.9 Whilst the Commission had initially proposed that
this Decision have a significant number of legal bases (Articles 13, 26, 47(2), 55,
71(1), 80(2), 89, 93, 95 and 285 EC [now Articles 19, 31, 53, 62, 91(1), 100(2), 109,
113, 114 and 338 TFEU]), 0 the Council limited the substantive legal bases to
Articles 13 and 95 EC. Under the Decision, the Council approved the CRPD on
behalf of the Community." The Decision provides:
Both the Community and its Members States have competence in the
fields covered by the UN Convention. The Community and Member States
should therefore become Contracting Parties to it, so that together they can
fulfil the obligations laid down by the UN Convention and exercise the
rights invested in them, in situations of mixed competence in a coherent
manner.12
The Decision also authorized the President of the Council to deposit the
instruments of formal confirmation of the Convention with the Secretary General
of the United Nations.13 However, this could only happen following the agreement
of a Code of Conduct by the Council, Commission and the Member States. The
Code was to determine 'the appropriate arrangements for representation of the
Community's position at meetings of the bodies created by the UN Convention'
and 'the arrangements for ensuring close cooperation' between the Commission
promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities', COM(2003)
16 final.
7 Economic and Social Committee (EC) 'Opinion on the Communication from the
Commission Towards a United Nations legally binding instrument to promote
and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities of 24 January 2003,
COM(2003) 16 final', 26 March 2003.
See D. Ferri, 'The Conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities by the EC/EU: A Constitutional Perspective', in L. Waddington and
G. Quinn (eds.) 2 European Yearbook ofDisability Law, (Intersentia, 2010), 63.
9 Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, [2010] OJ L303/16.
10 In conjunction with the procedural legal bases of Articles 300(2) and 300(3) EC (now
Articles 218(1) and 218(2) TFEU).
" Article 1(1).




and the Member States, in particular with regard to 'monitoring, reporting and
voting arrangements'. 4
The Decision also specified that, when depositing the instruments of formal
confirmation, the President of the Council would deposit a Declaration of
Competence. This was also foreseen in Article 44 of the CRPD, which concerns
regional integration organizations, and which was inserted into the Convention
specifically to allow the European Community to accede thereto. Article 44 CRPD
provides that regional integration organizations, meaning a regional organization
to which its Member States have transferred competence in respect of matters
governed by the Convention, can become a party to the Convention. When doing
so, such organizations are required to declare the extent of their competences
with regard to the fields covered by the Convention, and they are only bound
by the Convention within the limits of their competence. The Council Decision
contains, in Annex II, the necessary Declaration of Competence.
The Declaration of Competences contains a list of areas where the EC/
EU shares competence with the Member States. Amongst these are combating
discrimination on the grounds of disability, as well as free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital; agriculture; transport; taxation; internal market;
equal pay for men and women; trans-European network policy; and statistics. The
Declaration also contains a list of EC legislative instruments which illustrate the
competence of the EC/EU with regard to fields falling under the CRPD, and this
list refers to the Employment Equality Directive," which prohibits discrimination
on the ground of inter alia disability with regard to employment and vocational
training. This Directive is examined further below.
The aforementioned Code of Conduct 6 was adopted in November 2010. As
noted above, the Code is an agreement between the Council, the Member States
and the Commission that sets out the internal arrangements for the implementation
by, and representation of, the EU relating to the CRPD. Following the adoption
of the Code, the EU quickly deposited the instruments of formal confirmation of
the Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations, as provided for
in the Council Decision.
Following the conclusion of the CRPD by the EU, and the adoption of the
Council Decision and Code of Conduct, a key question concerns the extent to
which the EU is bound to take action in the fields covered by the Convention
which fall within its competence. Where the EU has exclusive competence to act,
it must clearly fulfil all relevant obligations in the Convention in their entirety. The
question is somewhat more vexed with regard to those many areas which involve
a shared competence of the EU and the Member States. One point of view is that
the EU is only obliged not to hamper the fulfillment of CRPD obligations by the
Member States in such fields. The EU may adopt policy and legislation in such
areas, and these should take the CRPD into account, but there is no obligation
14 Articles 4(2) and 4(3).
15 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L303/16.
16 Council Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the
Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and
representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, [2010] OJ C340/11.
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to implement the relevant provisions of Convention in their entirety through
EU instruments, since the 'default' position is that the Member States that have
ratified the CRPD bear the end responsibility for ensuring full compliance. At the
other extreme, one could argue that whenever the EU adopts policy or legislation
which relates to a field covered by the CRPD in an area of shared competence,
it should do its utmost to ensure full compliance. The EU is, after all, bound by
the Convention. Moreover, there is a risk that an EU instrument that refers to
the CRPD' but which only sets, for example, minimum standards, and does not
ensure full compliance with the CRPD, could leave the Member States with the
impression that nothing more than transposition of the EU instrument is needed,
and this would also secure compliance with the CRPD, which the State ratified
independently. An intermediate position argues that whilst the EU is not obliged
to implement fully the Convention in areas falling within its shared competence,
it must also not give the impression to Member States that transposition or
implementation of an EU measure which defacto only secures partial compliance
will be adequate in terms of meeting their obligations under the Convention. In
such situations Member States must be aware of their additional and remaining
commitments under the CRPD.
Such issues, in the context of inter alia the European Convention of Human
Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, were considered by the
European Court of Justice in Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council. The case
concerned a challenge by the European Parliament to Council Directive 2003/86/
EC on the right of family reunification." The Directive determines the conditions
for exercising the right to family reunification for third-country nationals residing
in the EU. The Parliament sought annulment of a number of provisions 20 which
provided for derogations from some provisions in the Directive. These derogations
allowed Member States to apply national law in such a way as to restrict family
reunification in certain situations where the children in question were over 12
years of age, or, in certain cases, over 15, and to impose certain waiting periods
prior to permitting reunification. The Parliament alleged that these provisions
permitted Member States to apply national legislation which did not respect
fundamental rights, including Article 8 of the ECHR and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Unlike the CRPD, the EU is not a party to either of these
instruments. However, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and the
constitutional traditions of the Member States, are amongst the general principles
of EU law, and the Parliament noted that the Union had a duty to respect them
pursuant to Article 6(2) EU (now Art. 6(3) Treaty on the European Union (TEU)).
Following a detailed examination, the Court found that none of the challenged
provisions amounted to a breach of fundamental rights, and based this on an
examination of the ECHR and its case law. However, in doing so, it noted that:
'It must be determined in particular whether [a challenged provision of the
Directive] expressly or impliedly authorizes the Member States not to observe
1 For example in the preamble.
18 Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR 1-5769. I am grateful to Prof.
Bruno de Witte, of Maastricht University and the European University Institute, for
bringing this case to my attention.
19 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, [2003] OJ L251/12.
20 Specifically the final subparagraph of Article 4(1), Article 4(6) and Article 8.
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those fundamental principles ... '.21 Whilst the Court found that the provisions in
question did not do this, the implication of this statement may be that where an EU
instrument does (appear to) give such an authorization, it can breach fundamental
rights as guaranteed and protected by EU law.
It is worth noting that the Court did not follow the Opinion of Advocate General
Kokott 22 in this case. The Advocate General firstly advised that the application
was inadmissible, as annulment of the contested provisions would alter the
substance of the Directive, and it was also not possible to annul the Directive as a
whole. However, in the alternative, the Advocate General did consider the merits
of the case and, here too, she differed from the line subsequently taken by the
Court. She found that Article 8 ECHR may exceptionally found an entitlement
to family reunification in the host State23 and that 'Community provisions are
compatible with fundamental rights if they are capable of being interpreted in a
way which produces the outcome which those rights require').2 Similarly, when
Member States implement a directive, they must ensure that they 'do not rely on
an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights
protected by the Community legal order or with any other general principles
of Community law.' 25 The question is therefore 'what rules Member States
may lawfully adopt if the Community provisions in question are interpreted in
conformity with fundamental rights'. 26
Whilst the Advocate General went on to find that the provisions relating to
family reunification of children were in conformity with human rights law, she
regarded Article 8 of the Directive, which allows Member States to require that
a sponsor has resided lawfully in the territory for a period of two, or even three
years, before being joined by family members, as being more problematic. She
found that Article 8 'empowered' Member States to provide for such waiting
periods, and that, where this was done without consideration of human rights
obligations, it would fail to allow for the possibility, as required by the European
Court of Human Rights, to consider hardship cases and allow for more rapid
reunification. 27 She even found that:
The reference to human rights in the second recital in the preamble to the
Directive even fosters misconceived and one-dimensional transposition
of this kind. Instead of reminding Member States of their responsibilities
in regard to fundamental and human rights, the recital asserts that the
Directive, as drafted, is compatible with them. If Member States rely
on that assessment on the part of the Community legislature, they have
no reason to consider any issues of fundamental and human rights not
addressed in terms of the Directive. 28
21 Para. 84 of judgment.
22 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered 8 September 2005.
23 Para. 72 of the Opinion.
24 Ibid., para. 80.
25 Ibid., para. 81.
26 Ibid., para. 82.
27 Ibid., para. 103.
28 Ibid., para. 104.
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Consequently, Advocate General Kokott concluded that Article 8 of the Directive
was 'liable at least to be misunderstood'29 and this increased 'the risk that human
rights will be infringed'.30 In that case, responsibility would lie with both the
national and the Community legislature. 'Since human rights must be protected
effectively, and the law has to be clear, Article 8 of the Directive is contrary
to Community law.'3' However, as noted, the Court did not follow this line
of reasoning, and concluded that the provision did not amount to a breach of
fundamental rights. Nevertheless, both the Court and the Advocate General
seemed to agree that a provision of EU law must not 'expressly or impliedly
authorize ... the Member States not to observe those fundamental principles ... '32
They differed in their assessment of whether Article 8 of the Directive did in fact
do this.
This requirement is important in the context of the CRPD. Having concluded
the CRPD, the EU is referring to the Convention in the preambles of instruments
which it adopts and which relate to the rights of persons with disabilities.33 This
is also the case for those instruments which relate to the shared competence of
the EU, and which may not necessarily fully implement the relevant provisions of
the Convention. Caution must be exercised here in order to ensure that Member
States are not being lulled into a false sense of security, and left with the belief
that compliance with EU law is equivalent to compliance with the Convention
in areas of shared competence, where the EU has not fully implemented CRPD
provisions.
3. THE CRPD, THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY AND THE
PRINCIPLES OF NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY
The Convention, as is appropriate for a human rights instrument, strongly reflects
the social model of disability.34 Explicit recognition is made of the fact that
'disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and
29 Ibid., para. 105.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Para. 84 of judgment.
33 See e.g. the 'Better Regulation Directive' (Directive 2009/140/EC of 25 November
2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities,
and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and
services [2009 OJ L337/37), which provides in Recital 22: 'In line with the objectives
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the regulatory framework
should ensure that all users, including disabled end-users, the elderly, and users with
special social needs, have easy access to affordable high quality services. ...'
34 The social model of disability canbe contrasted with the medical model of disability.
The latter argues that a disability is a direct consequence of an impairment, and is
the result of an incapacity caused by an impairment. There is a wealth of literature
addressing theoretical models of disability. See e.g. M. Oliver, Understanding
Disability: from theory to practice, (Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), and M. Priestley,
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attitudinal and environmental barriers'.35 Whilst the concept of disability is not
defined in the Convention, Article 1 does provide:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical,
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with
various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society
on an equal basis with others.
The Convention therefore reflects the reality that disability stems primarily from
the failure of the social environment to meet the needs and aspirations of people
with impairments, and is the highest legal manifestation and confirmation of the
social model of disability on the international stage.
The principles of equality and non-discrimination run through the Convention
like a red thread. They find their anchor in Article 3, which Gerard Quinn has
described as providing the 'moral compass for change' 36 which the Convention
embraces. This article refers not only to non-discrimination and equality of
opportunity, but to a series of other principles which 'animate' the Convention,
including dignity; individual autonomy; full and active participation and inclusion;
respect for difference; and accessibility. The principles of non-discrimination and
equality find repeated reference elsewhere in the Convention. In light of this,
Article 2, which elaborates on key terms used in the Convention, contains a broad
definition of 'discrimination on the basis of disability' as meaning:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which
has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including
denial of reasonable accommodation. 37
The article goes on to define reasonable accommodation as meaning:
necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to
'Constructions and creations: idealism, materialism and disability theory', 13
Disability and Society 1 (1998), 75.
35 Preamble, Recital (e) and Article 1.
36 G. Quinn, 'The UN Convention on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities',
10 June 2007, paper on file with author, at 3.
37 For information on the drafting history of this article see: S. Trcmel, 'A Personal
Perspective onthe Drafting of the United Nations Conventiononthe Rights of Persons
with Disabilities', in G. Quinn and L.Waddington (eds.), 1 European Yearbook of
Disability Law, (Intersentia, 2009), 115 at 122-124, and M. Schulze, Understanding
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities A Handbook on the
Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (Handicap International September,
2009), available at: <www.enablement.nl/pdf/HI_CRPDManual sept2009_final.
pdf> at 34-36 (accessed 27 June 2012).
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ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal
basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The principles of equality and non-discrimination also receive specific attention in
Article 5.38 This article embraces both a formal approach to equality ('equal before
and under the law');39 and a more substantive approach ('prohibit discrimination on
the basis of disability'; 40 provision of 'reasonable accommodation';4' and positive
action measures 42 'shall not be considered discrimination'). States Parties are
under an obligation to recognize and ensure protection of these rights. Elsewhere
the Convention is 'sprinkled' liberally with references to non-discrimination,
equality and reasonable accommodation. Article 6, another transversal article
addressing the particular needs of women with disabilities, specifies that States
Parties recognize that women and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple
discrimination. Eliminating discrimination, in the sense of removing obstacles
and barriers to accessibility, lies at the heart of Article 9.
A key principle found in many Convention articles is that people with
disabilities should have access to rights 'on an equal basis with others'. For
example, Article 12, on equal recognition before the law, and Article 13, on access
to justice, refer to the need to recognize that people with disabilities 'enjoy legal
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life', and that they have
'effective access to justice ... on an equal basis with others', respectively. The
relative nature of the right to equality is hereby stressed. The implication is that,
in order to enable people with disabilities to enjoy equal rights or equal access,
States Parties will sometimes be under an obligation to take additional measures.
These could be individualized reasonable accommodations, or more general
measures to provide accessibility, which are not directed at specific individuals.
Lastly, one should note that the scope of the Convention is extremely broad.43
The Convention does not simply prohibit disability discrimination, nor does it
only cover civil or political rights, or economic, cultural or social rights. Instead
the principles of non-discrimination and equality underpin the Convention, and,
as noted above, these are linked to a broad group of rights. These rights are both
38 See J. Kumpuvuori and M. Scheinin, 'Treating the Different One Differently -
a Vehicle for Equality for Persons with Disabilities? Implications of Article 5
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities', in J. Kumpuvuori
and M. Scheinin (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Multidisciplinary Perspectives, (The Center for Human Rights of




42 The Convention does not refer to positive action, but instead speaks of 'Specific
measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality', Article 5(4).
43 G. Quinn, 'The UN Convention on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities',
10 June 2007, paper on file with author, at 9, and T. J. Melish, 'Perspectives on
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The UN Disability
Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify', 14




civil and political, such as the right to liberty,4 as well as more substantive, such
as the right to education.
4. EU DISABILITY NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY LAW
4.1. GENERAL OVERVIEW
For most of the history of the EU,46 the founding Treaties contained no explicit
reference to disability, and therefore no disability-specific competence existed.4 1
Nevertheless, occasional references to disability, and disabled people, were
found in a handful of legal instruments and soft law initiatives, although these
did not amount to an attempt to develop a broad disability policy or strategy
until relatively recently. From a competence-related perspective, the major
breakthrough occurred with the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force
in 1999, and which included the first explicit mention of disability. The most
significant reference occurred in the context of a general non-discrimination
article, which is now found in Article 19 TFEU. This article provides the EU
with the competence to take action to combat discrimination on a number of
enumerated grounds, including disability. Such action can be taken in all the
fields in which the EU has the power to act. The article48 provided the legal
basis for the Employment Equality Directive of 2000, which prohibits disability
discrimination, as well as discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation,
age and religion or belief, with regard to employment, and for a 2008 proposal
for a directive,'4 9 which covers, inter alia, access to goods and services, and which
again addresses disability amongst a number of other grounds.
The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, introduced some further
important changes with regard to disability. Article 10 TFEU contains a
mainstreaming provision, which provides that in 'defining and implementing
its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based
on ... disability'. Rather than relying only on disability-specific measures,
mainstreaming implies that disability-related needs will be pursued in all
activities. The Lisbon Treaty also changed the status of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which had first been adopted at Nice. Under Article 6(1)
TEU, the Charter now has the same legal value as the Treaties, and the EU is
obliged to comply with the Charter in all its activities, as are the Member States
44 Article 14, which covers liberty and security of the person.
45 Article 24.
46 And its predecessors, the EC and EEC.
47 For a much more detailed examination of the evolution of the EC/EU's competences
with regard to disability, and the development of the EC/EU's disability policy,
see: L. Waddington, From Rome to Nice in a Wheelchair, The Development of a
European Disability Policy, (Europa Law Publishing, 2006).
48 In its previous form as Article 13 EC.
49 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the prin-
ciple of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability,
age or sexual orientation, COM (2008) 425, Brussels, 2 July 2008. Following the
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the legal basis of this proposal was changed
from Article 13 EC to Article 19 TFEU.
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when they are implementing EU law. The Charter itself specifically addresses
the rights of people with disabilities in a number of articles. Under Article 21,
discrimination on any ground, including disability, shall be prohibited, whilst
under Article 26, the Union recognizes and respects the rights of persons with
disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence,
social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community.
In addition to these disability-specific references in the Treaties (TFEU and
TEU) and Charter, the EU has adopted a number of legal instruments that pay
particular attention to the situation of people with disabilities. On occasions
disability-specific references have been included in such instruments on a
structural basis, and a generally successful mainstreaming approach has been
pursued. This is largely the case with regard to instruments related to transport,
where references to disability have been included in mainstream secondary
legislation establishing, for example, technical standards applicable to transport
modes and infrastructure, 0 and general passenger rights.5 ' In contrast, one
disability-specific instrument, a Regulation relating to the rights of air passengers
with reduced mobility, has also been adopted.5 2 It is worth noting that all of
these instruments have been adopted in the absence of any explicit reference to
disability in the Treaty Chapter relating to transport. The TFEU53 has therefore
explicitly given the EU the competence to legislate in the field of transport, and
the EU has exercised this competence by, inter alia, including references to the
needs of passengers with a disability, and disability accessibility, in some of the
secondary legislation adopted under this Chapter.
In contrast, in some other areas, disability seems to have been addressed in
a rather ad hoc and perhaps random manner. One example of such a field is the
internal market, where occasional references to disability are found in instruments
based on (what is now) Article 114 TFEU. For example, Directive 95/16/EC5' on
50 See, for example, Regulation (EC) No. 1899/2006 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 3922/91 on the harmonization of technical requirements and administrative
procedures in the field of civil aviation, [2006] OJ L377/1; Directive 2006/87/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 laying
down technical requirements for inland waterway vessels and repealing Council
Directive 82/714/EEC, [2006] OJ L389/1; and Commission Regulation (EC) No.
8/2008 of 11 December 2007 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 as
regards common technical requirements and administrative procedures applicable
to commercial transportation by aeroplane, [2008] OJ L10/1.
51 See, for example, Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by
road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 1191/69 and 1107/70, [2007] OJ
L315/1 and Regulation (EC) No. 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers' rights and obligations.
52 Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
5 July 2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced
mobility when travelling by air, [2007] OJ L315/14.
53 And its predecessors, the EC and EEC Treaties.
54 Directive 95/16/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to lifts, [1995] OJ L213/1 as amended.
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lifts refers to the need to ensure accessibility for disabled persons; Directives
2004/1711 and 2004/1856 on public procurement provide that, whenever possible,
technical specifications relating to public procurement contracts should take into
account accessibility for disabled people and design for all requirements;" and
Directive 2002/228 on universal services and users' rights relating to electronic
communication networks and services requires Member States to ensure that
covered services are affordable for disabled users and that they have the same
conditions of access as others. All of these instruments have, as their legal basis,
Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC),59 and therefore recognize the disability dimension
to securing the internal market. However, there are many other internal market
provisions which would seem to offer the potential to mainstream disability
issues, such as the General Product Safety Directive,60 but which fail to do so, and
the inclusion of appropriate provisions relating to disability in internal market
provisions does not seem (yet) to be an automatic process.
4.2. THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY DIRECTIVE6'
The most significant piece of secondary legislation relating to disability is
arguably the aforementioned Employment Equality Directive. The Directive
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and
sexual orientation with regard to employment and vocational training. The related
Racial Equality Directive 6 2 prohibits discrimination on the ground of race and
ethnic origin, and covers not only employment and vocational training, but also
fields such as access to and supply of goods and services, social protection, social
Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, [2004] OJ L134/1.
56 Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, [2004] OJ
L134/114.
In this context see Standardization Mandate to CEN / CENELEC and ETSI in
support of European Accessibility Requirements for Public Procurement in the Built
Environment, M/420.
58 Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), [2002] OJ
L108/51.
59 In the case of Directive 2004/17 and 2004/18 on public procurement, Articles 47(2)
EC and 55 EC are also legal bases in addition to Article 95 EC.
60 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December
2001 on general product safety, [2002] OJ L11/4.
61 See also R. Whittle, 'The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment
and Occupation: An Analysis from a Disability Rights perspective', 27 European
Law Review 3 (2002), 303, and D. L. Hoskins, 'Great Expectations: Protection from
Discrimination Because of Disability in Community Law, 31 European Law Review
5 (2006), 667; and, for a more general perspective, L. Waddington and M.Bell,
'More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives', 38
Common Mlarket Law Review (2001), 587.
62 Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of Equal Treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L180/22.
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advantages and education. Additional Directives prohibit gender discrimination, 63
and have a similar material scope to the Racial Equality Directive.
4.2.]. Definition ofDiscrimination
All of the aforementioned equality directives contain definitions of the concept
of discrimination. For all grounds, and in all areas, four forms of discrimination
are prohibited: direct discrimination; indirect discrimination; harassment; and an
instruction to discriminate.
Consequently, the Employment Equality Directive defines direct discrimina-
tion on the ground of disability as occurring:
where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been, or
would be treated in a comparable situation on [the ground of disability]. 64
Direct discrimination therefore involves adverse treatment that is directly
motivated by the covered ground, in casu disability. Comparison is at the heart
of the definition of direct discrimination under EU law, and a person who
alleges direct discrimination must be compared to someone who does not have
that characteristic. This can either be someone without a disability, or someone
with a different form of disability. In addition, in order to establish direct
discrimination, less favourable treatment must have occurred, and the reason for
the less favourable treatment must be directly related to disability.
The Directive defines indirect discrimination on the ground of disability as
occurring when:
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons
having ... a particular disability ... at a particular disadvantage compared
with other persons unless:
(i) that provision, criterion orpractice is objectively justified by a legitimate
aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or
(ii) as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any
person or organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under
national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the principles
contained in Article 5 [reasonable accommodation] in order to eliminate
disadvantages entailed by such provision, criterion or practice. 65
This definition is based on a line of case law developed by the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) in the context of indirect sex discrimination, commencing with
63 Directive (EC) 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities
and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation
(recast) [2006] OJ L204/23 and Directive (EC) 2004/113 implementing the principle
of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and





the well-known judgment in Bilka.66 This case concerned a woman who worked
part-time and who, as a result, found it more difficult than full-time workers to
qualify for a supplementary occupational pension scheme, which is regarded as
a form of pay under EU law. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, which was in force
at the time, required that men and women received equal pay for equal work.
The employee in this case, Karin Weber von Hartz, argued that the occupational
pension scheme, which was operated by the employer, indirectly discriminated
against women, as 75% of women employed by the company worked part-time,
in comparison with only 10% of male employees. As a result, female employees
were much less likely to qualify for the pension than male employees. The Court
found that:
If ... it should be found that a much lower proportion of women than of men
work full time, the exclusion of part-time workers from the occupational
pension scheme would be contrary to Article 119 of the Treaty where,
taking into account the difficulties encountered by women workers in
working full time, that measure could not be explained by factors which
exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex.
The Court then went on to establish a three-pronged test to establish an objective
justification for an impugned measure. In order to be justified, and therefore not
indirectly discriminatory, the measure had to correspond to a real need on the
part of the undertaking, be appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives
pursued, and be necessary to that end.67 Schiek has stated: 'From this, one can
conclude that, where there is a less discriminatory alternative, the measure is not
objectively justified.' 68
In the context of disability and the Employment Equality Directive, indirect
discrimination involves an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice. The
condition of neutrality is met where the measure in question makes no explicit
reference to disability. However, where that measure is more likely to lead to a
disadvantage for persons with disabilities, or for persons with particular forms
of disability, it will be prima facie discriminatory. For example, a requirement
that all employees possess a driving licence will be more difficult, or impossible,
for persons with certain disabilities, such as a significant visual impairment or
uncontrolled epilepsy, to comply with, than for other persons. Such measures can
nevertheless be permitted, and therefore not amount to indirect discrimination,
if they are 'objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving
that aim are appropriate and necessary'. This is a cumulative requirement,
involving an aim which is legitimate, as well as a demonstration that the means
of achieving the aim are both appropriate and necessary. For example, a driving
licence requirement may serve the legitimate aim of ensuring staff are able to
drive around the locality on work-related business, and, in that respect, it would
be appropriate. However, if a staff member without a driving licence could be
66 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kanfhaus GmbHy. Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607.
67 Para. 56.
68 D. Schiek, 'Chapter Three, Indirect Discrimination', in D. Schiek, L. Waddington
and M. Bell (eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and
International Non-Discrimination Law, (Hart Publishing, 2007), 323 at 357.
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excused this task, or allowed to use a taxi, it would not be regarded as necessary,
and would therefore amount to indirect discrimination. Second, under the
Directive a measure which indirectly discriminates against a disabled person
will also be justified if the employer or other covered party provides the affected
disabled persons with a reasonable accommodation, and thereby removes the
disadvantage for those individuals.
The third form of discrimination which is prohibited under the Employment
Equality Directive is harassment. This occurs:
where unwanted conduct related to [the ground of disability] takes place
with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and of
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive
environment. 69
The conduct in question can take many forms, and include words, actions or
pictures. Unlike direct and indirect discrimination, no comparator is needed to
establish that harassment has occurred.
Lastly, the Employment Equality Directive prohibits an 'instruction to
discriminate against persons [on the ground of disability]'."0
One point of note is that while direct discrimination and harassment are
prohibited on 'the ground of disability', under the Directive only individuals
who have 'a particular disability' are protected from indirect discrimination.
This is significant because individuals who are not disabled themselves can
nevertheless experience discrimination on the grounds of disability, and, by
using this terminology in the context of direct discrimination and harassment,
the Directive has allowed for a broader personal scope, in terms of protection.
Consequently, individuals who experience direct discrimination or harassment
because they associate with a disabled person are protected by the Directive." In
contrast the Convention, rather tersely, simply requires States Parties to 'prohibit
all discrimination on the basis of disability'.72 The possible significance of this
difference will be explored later.
4.2.2. Reasonable Accommodation
The Employment Equality Directive also imposes a requirement on Member
States to establish an obligation to make reasonable accommodations to meet
the needs of disabled individuals, unless this would amount to a disproportionate
burden. This obligation, which does not extend to the other grounds covered by
EU equality law, is found in Article 5. The article provides:
In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment
in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall
be provided. This means that employers shall take appropriate measures,
69 Article 2(3).
To Article 2(4).
71 See Case C-303/06 Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, [2008] ECR 1-5603,
discussed below.
72 Article 5(2), CRPD. Italics added.
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where needed in aparticular case, to enable a personwitha disability to have
access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to provide training
for such a person, unless such measures would impose a disproportionate
burden on the employer. When this burden is, to a sufficient extent,
remedied by existing measures as an element of disability policy in the
Member State, it should not be considered disproportionate.
The obligation to make a reasonable accommodation on the grounds of disability,
which is also found in the CRPD, is based on the recognition that, on occasions,
the interaction between an individual's impairment and the physical or social
environment can result in the inability to perform a particular function, job or
activity in the conventional manner. The characteristic of impairment is relevant
in that it can lead to an individual being faced with a barrier that prevents him
or her from benefiting from an employment or other opportunity that is open to
others who do not share that characteristic.
However, non-discrimination law is traditionally underpinned by the idea
that the protected characteristic, such as race or gender, is rarely relevant to the
employment or other decision, and only in exceptional circumstances, such as
the bona fide occupational qualification situation, does it allow for different or
unequal treatment. Therefore the protected characteristic should be ignored.
However, ignoring, by failing to accommodate, the characteristic of impairment,
can result in denying an individual equal opportunity. In this respect, Fredman
has argued:
Characterising disability as an irrelevant characteristic removes the
underlying justification for detrimental treatment, but insisting on
similar treatment simply reinforces a particular norm and perpetuates
disadvantage.7
A reasonable accommodation requirement in the employment context therefore
prohibits an employer from denying an individual with a disability an employment
opportunity by failing to take account of the individual's impairment, when
taking account of it - in terms of changing tasks or the physical environment
of the workplace - would enable the individual to do the work."' Clearly, this
requires an individualized analysis, both in terms of the abilities of the recipient
of the accommodation, and the work-related skills and activities that are required.
Lastly, it is worth noting that, while Article 5 clearly establishes the duty to
make a reasonable accommodation, and specifies that this is necessary 'in order
to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment', it does not state
that failure to comply with the duty amounts to a form of discrimination. This
can be contrasted with the Convention, which clearly specifies, in Article 2, that
denial of a reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination.
73 S. Fredman, 'Disability Equality, A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination
Paradigm?', in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds.), Disability Rights in Europe. From
Theory to Practice, (Hart, 2005), 199 at 203.
74 P. S. Karlan and G. Rutherglen, 'Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable
Accommodation', 46 Duke Law Journal (1996), 9.
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4.2.3. Case Law of the European Court ofJustice Interpreting the Personal
Scope of the Disability Provisions of the Employment Equality
Directive'
Thus far the European Court of Justice has considered the disability-related
provisions of the Employment Equality Directive in only two cases, both of which
concerned the personal scope of the Directive. In Chacon Navas76 the Court had
to consider the meaning of the term 'disability' and determine what amounted
to a disability for the purposes of the Directive, whilst in Coleman" the Court
had to rule on whether a mother who claimed she had been discriminated against
because of her connection with her disabled son was protected by the Directive.
The Chacon Navas case concerned a woman who, as a result of illness, had
not been able to work for her employer for some time. She was dismissed after
a period of absence. Ms. Chac6n Navas challenged the decision to dismiss her
inter alia on the grounds that it was incompatible with the Employment Equality
Directive. The national court decided to stay the proceedings and referred two
questions to the Court of Justice. In essence the national court asked whether the
provision of the Directive which prohibits disability discrimination also included
within its protective scope a worker who had been dismissed solely because
she was sick. In the alternative, could sickness 'be regarded as an identifying
attribute in addition to the ones in relation to which Directive 2000/78 prohibits
discrimination? "
In response, the Court stated the Directive was designed to combat employment
discrimination and defined disability in that context as 'a limitation which results
in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which
hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life'." For any
limitation to be regarded as a 'disability', 'it must be probable that it will last for
a long time'."o In addition the Court held that for the purposes of the Directive,
'disability' is different from 'sickness',"' and there was nothing in the Directive
'to suggest that workers are protected by the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of disability as soon as they develop any type of sickness'. 8 2 The Court
further stated that its definition of disability was 'autonomous and uniform'.83 The
Court also held that sickness could not be added to the list of grounds covered
This section is based on extracts from L. Waddington 'Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas
v. Eurest Colectividades SA, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2006', 44
Common Market Law Review 2 (2007), 487, and L. Waddington, 'Case C-303/06,
S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the
Court of Justice of 17 July 2008', 46 Common Market Law Review 2 (2009), 665.
6 Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, [2006] ECR 1-6467.
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by the Directive, since it was not explicitly mentioned in the Directive or the EC
Treaty (now TFEU)."4
The definition of disability developed by the Court in Chacon Navas is based
on the medical or individual model of disability. According to the definition
developed by the Court the cause of the disadvantage (or the 'limitation') is the
'impairment' which an individual has, and it is the 'impairment' which hinders
participation in professional life. Therefore, the problem lies in the impaired
individual, and not in the reaction of society to the impairment or the organization
of society.
This model canbe contrasted witha social model of disability, which is reflected
in the CRPD. The social model is based on a socio-political approach which argues
that disability stems primarily from the failure of the social environment to adjust
to the needs and aspirations of people with impairments, rather than from the
inability of people with impairments to adapt to the environment. According to
this model, disability is the result of an interaction between an impairment and an
inaccessible and discriminatory environment, rather than being the consequence
of a medical condition which results in reduced ability.
The second case, Coleman, concerned a woman who was a legal secretary
and the mother of a disabled child who required specialized care. She alleged
that, on returning to work after having given birth to her child, she was treated
less favourably than other employees in comparable positions because she was
the primary carer of a child with a disability. She made a number of allegations
of adverse treatment, including that she was not allowed to return to her original
job following her maternity leave, whilst parents of non-disabled children were
allowed to do this; she was not allowed the same flexibility regarding her working
hours as parents of non-disabled children; she was described as 'lazy' for
requesting time off to care for her child, and threatened with dismissal when she
occasionally arrived late because of the need to care for her child, when parents
of non-disabled children were not treated in this way; and that highly abusive
comments were made about her and her child. Ultimately Ms. Coleman accepted
voluntary redundancy, and subsequently lodged a claim before an Employment
Tribunal in London that she had been subject to unfair constructive dismissal"
and had been discriminated against because she was the primary carer of a
disabled child.
The Employment Tribunal which heard the case had to determine if the
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) provided protection from such
discrimination. The Act clearly prohibited discrimination against individuals
who had a disability themselves, but was silent as to whether individuals who
experienced discrimination not because they had a disability themselves, but
because they associated with an individual with a disability, were protected. It was
accepted by all parties that, on a literal interpretation of the relevant wording of the
DDA, only those individuals who had a disability themselves were protected from
discrimination. However, a European dimension also arose because the DDA had
84 Paras. 55-57.
85 A constructive dismissal occurs where an employee 'resigns' following illegal
behaviour by the employer, such as discrimination, which leads the employee to
conclude that continued employment with this employer is impossible. The former
employee can challenge such unfair constructive dismissals before the courts.
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been amended86 with effect from 2004 in order to comply with the Employment
Equality Directive. The question of whether the Employment Equality Directive
prohibited discrimination in such circumstances was therefore of significance,
and the claimant's case turned on this matter."
As noted above, the Directive prohibits direct discrimination and harassment
'on ... the grounds' of inter alia disability. Protection is not explicitly confined
to individuals who have a disability, and the claimant's lawyers argued that, by
virtue of using this language, the Directive prohibited 'associative discrimination'
with regard to direct discrimination and harassment, and the DDA should also
be interpreted in this way. The Employment Tribunal concluded that guidance
from the European Court of Justice was required on this matter in order for
it to proceed," and forwarded a number of preliminary references which, in
essence, asked whether the Employment Equality Directive prohibited direct
discrimination and harassment against employees who, although not themselves
disabled, were subject to the less favourable treatment on the grounds that they
associated with a person who was disabled.
In response, the Court began by recalling the purpose of the Directive, which
it found to be 'to combat all forms of discrimination on grounds of disability'
with regard to employment and occupation.89 Following its Advocate General, it
noted that the 'principle of equal treatment ... applies not to a particular category
of person but by reference to the grounds mentioned in Article 1.'90 However, the
Court went on to note that some provisions of the Directive, including Article 5
relating to reasonable accommodation, did only apply to disabled people. It then
noted that the existence of such disability-specific measures in the Directive
could not lead to the conclusion that the protection from discrimination provided
by the Directive as a whole should also be confined to people who actually had a
disability themselves.
The Court then addressed a second argument raised by some Member
States:9' that, in light of the Court's earlier judgment in Chacon Navas, the
concept of disability should be interpreted very 'strictly'. 9 2 In response, the Court
acknowledged that it had held that the personal scope of the Directive could not
be extended beyond the grounds enumerated in the Directive and Article 13 EC
in Chacon Navas. However, it stressed that, in that case, it had not held that the
grounds that were covered by the Directive had to be interpreted 'strictly'. 9 3
86 By the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, which
came into force on 1 October 2004.
8 In the words of Advocate General Poiares Maduro: 'Ms. Coleman can succeed in
her case only if the Directive is to be interpreted as prohibiting discrimination by
association', (para. 5).
88 Employment Tribunal, Case Number 2303745/2005, 17 February 2006.
89 Para. 38.
90 Ibid.
91 United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands.
92 The term 'strictly' is used by the Court in its judgment. However, as pointed out by
an anonymous peer reviewer of this article, it might be more appropriate to refer to
a 'narrow' interpretation of the concept of disability in this context. I am grateful to




The Court continued by considering the argument that the objectives and
effectiveness of the Directive would be undermined if someone in Ms. Coleman's
position could not rely on the prohibition of direct discrimination. The Court
recalled that Ms. Coleman alleged that she suffered less favourable treatment
on the ground of disability, and noted once again that the Directive functions by
reference to the covered grounds, and not with regard to a particular category of
person. The Court concluded that, when an employee suffers direct discrimination
on the grounds of disability, an interpretation of the Directive which limited its
application only to people who had a disability themselves 'is liable to deprive that
directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection
which it is intended to guarantee."'
Turning to the matter of harassment by association, the Court applied a
similar line of reasoning as with regard to direct discrimination, and concluded its
judgment by ruling that the protection from direct discrimination and harassment
found in the Employment Equality Directive is not limited to people who are
themselves disabled, but also applies when an employer directly discriminates
against or harasses an employee, where that discrimination or harassment is
based on the disability of the employee's child, whose care is provided primarily
by the employee.
5. POSSIBLE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE CRPD AND EU NON-
DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY LAW
The previous two sections of the paper have examined the key provisions in
the CRPD and EU law relating to non-discrimination and equality, including
reasonable accommodation. In this section a comparison will be made between
CRPD and EU law with a view to identifying relevant differences and possible
tensions in the fields of non-discrimination and equality. Where such differences
or tensions are identified, the section reflects on the possible consequences for
EU law, and, in light of the fact that non-discrimination is an area of shared
competence, for the Member States. As will be revealed, a failure by EU law to
meet in full the standards set by the CRPD with regard to non-discrimination and
equality does not necessarily mean that the EU is in breach of the Convention, but
instead can lead to an obligation falling on the Member States to fill the remaining
'gap' through national legislation and policy.
5.1. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION -DIRECT AND INDIRECT
DISCRIMINATION
As will be recalled, the CRPD requires States Parties to 'prohibit all
discrimination',15 and discrimination itself is defined as 'any distinction, exclu-
sion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis
with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms ... '96 The Convention
94 Para. 51.
95 Article 5(2), CRPD.
96 Article 2, CRPD.
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therefore does not explicitly refer to direct or indirect discrimination, and nor
does it mention harassment as a form of discrimination.
In contrast, the Employment Equality Directive explicitly defines and
prohibits four types of discrimination: direct and indirect discrimination,
harassment and an instruction to discriminate. In spite of this difference in
approach, there can be no doubt that the Directive's higher level of specificity is
in line with the Convention. Indeed, one could argue that a legal system which
only prohibited direct discrimination, and therefore adopted a strictly formal
approach to equality, would breach the Convention, as it would fail to prohibit 'all
forms of discrimination'. Moreover, the reference to 'any distinction, exclusion
or restriction on the basis of disability which has the ... effect of impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise ... of all human rights"' in Article 2 CRPD
can be interpreted as an implicit reference to indirect discrimination,98 where the
focus is likewise on the adverse impact on persons with disabilities of the action
in question, rather than on the intention or purpose behind the action.
This understanding of the CRPD definition of discrimination is supported
by a proposal made by the EC during the negotiation of the Convention. At the
seventh negotiating session, the EC proposed an amendment to the definition of
'discrimination on the basis of disability' which, at that time, read:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has
the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on a basis of equality with others, of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or
any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including direct
and indirect discrimination."
The EC proposed that the phrase 'including direct and indirect discrimination'
should be deleted from the definition, because this was already covered by the
phrase 'all forms of discrimination'.'
97 Italics have been added.
98 For a similar argument see: Marianne Schulze, Understanding the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A Handbook on the Human Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, (Handicap International September 2009), at 35 available
at: <www.enablement.nl/pdf/HICRPDManual sept2009_final.pdf> (accessed
27 June 2012), and S. Tromel, 'A Personal Perspective on the Drafting of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities', in G. Quinn and
L. Waddington (eds.), 1 European Yearbook of Disability Law, (Intersentia, 2009),
115 at 123.
99 Italics have been added.
100 Article 2 - Definitions, Seventh Session, Comments, proposals and amendments
submitted electronically, European Union, pages 4 and 5, available at: <www.un.org/




The CRPD clearly defines a denial of a reasonable accommodation as a form
of discrimination,0 ' and places an obligation on States Parties to ensure that
reasonable accommodation is provided '[i]n order to promote equality and
eliminate discrimination'. 0 2 Incontrast, whilst the Employment Equality Directive
clearly requires EU Member States to establish a duty to provide a reasonable
accommodation, and this is done '[i]n order to guarantee compliance with the
principle of equal treatment', a failure to make a reasonable accommodation
is not classified as a form of discrimination under the Directive. Whilst some
Member States have chosen to make an explicit link between a breach of the
duty to provide a reasonable accommodation and discrimination,'03 many have
not done so, and have simply established the obligation, whilst not classifying
a breach of that obligation as a form of discrimination.o' At first sight it might
appear that this distinction is relatively unimportant, and what matters is that the
legislation establishes a clear obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation,
and not how a breach of that duty is labelled. However, there can be (significant)
consequences of identifying an action as discrimination or as some other form
of prohibited act. Identifying a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation
as discrimination may result in, on the one hand, an increased awareness of the
rights-based nature of the duty to accommodate, and on the other, a recognition,
amongst both people with disabilities and employers, of the seriousness of a
failure to comply with the duty. However, aside from these speculative arguments,
there can also be more practical implications of identifying a failure to make a
reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimination. EU law, including the
Employment Equality Directive, provides for a partial reversal of the burden of
proof with regard to allegations of direct and indirect discrimination.' 5 Reasonable
accommodation is not mentioned in this context, although Member States are
free to extend this rule to other forms of prohibited activities. A classification of
a failure to make a reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimination, either
as a sub-category of direct or indirect discrimination or as a sui generis form,
could lead to the rule on the burden of proof, which favours the complainant,
being extended to cases of alleged failures to make a reasonable accommodation.
In addition, judges may be empowered or inclined to order more far-reaching
sanctions and remedies in cases of discrimination than in cases of other wrongs.
Consequently, a variety of consequences can flow from the decision to identify a
101 Article 2, CRPD.
102 Article 5(3), CRPD.
103 See, for example, the relevant legislation in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. For more information see D. Schiek,
L. Waddington and M. Bell (eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on National,
Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law, (Hart Publishing, 2007),
Chapter Six, Reasonable Accommodation.
104 See for example the relevant legislation in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia and Finland.
Nevertheless, it is possible that courts in these jurisdictions may interpret a failure to
make a reasonable accommodation as a form of (direct or indirect) discrimination.
105 Employment Equality Directive, Article 10.
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failure to make a reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimination rather
than as some other form of prohibited act.
Given the unambiguous language of the Convention, one can conclude that
there is a duty on States Parties to ensure that a failure to make an accommodation
is regarded as form of discrimination. However, and in spite of the comments
made in the previous paragraph, it is submitted that this does not imply that the
EU is in breach of its obligations under the Convention with regard to Article 5
of the Employment Equality Directive. Whilst the Directive does not explicitly
define a failure to make a reasonable accommodation as a form of discrimination,
it also does not exclude this possibility either, and this is demonstrated by the
many Member States which have opted to transpose the Directive in this way.
One could argue that, in light of the obligations on the EU and its Member States
under the CRPD, Article 5 of the Directive should now be interpreted as meaning
that a failure to accommodate should be regarded as a form of discrimination,
in addition to those forms explicitly mentioned in Article 2 of the Directive. It
would be up to the Court of Justice of the EU, as the body that gives authoritative
interpretations of EU law, to read such an obligation into Article 5. Up until now
the Court has not been called upon to rule on this issue, although it did make
reference to the reasonable accommodation duty in the Directive in both Chacon
Navas and Coleman. A preliminary reference from the Danish courts, in the
joined cases of Skouboe Werge06 and Ring,o' may be the first opportunity for
the Court to address this issue. These cases are also the first disability-related
references in the context of the Employment Equality Directive to reach the Court
after the conclusion of the CRPD by the EU. In Skouboe Werge and Ring, the
Danish courts have asked a series of questions, related both to the concept of
disability and to the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation. Whilst the
Court of Justice is not asked directly to determine whether a failure to make a
reasonable accommodation amounts to a form of discrimination, one question
asks, in essence, whether a dismissal which follows a period of absence from
work, which was itself caused by a failure to make a reasonable accommodation,
is compatible with the Directive. This question could open the door for the Court
to clarify the nature of the duty to accommodate.
However, even if the Court declines to interpret Article 5 of the Employment
Equality Directive in this way, this would still not rule out the possibility for those
EU Member States, which have not yet done so, to make an explicit link between
a failure to make a reasonable accommodation and discrimination. In that sense,
one could argue that whilst EU law does not require that Member States define
a failure to accommodate as discrimination, this would still be an obligation
on those Member States which have ratified the Convention. As noted above,
this approach would reflect the fact that combating discrimination is an area
of shared competence. In such fields, the EU may choose to set only minimum
requirements, leaving Member States free to set higher standards as appropriate.
The Employment Equality Directive would therefore not hinder compliance with






5.3. THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
The CRPD does not contain a definition of disability. Whilst this issue was
considered during the negotiation of the Convention, the inclusion and setting of
a definition was ultimately regarded as too controversial, and was not supported
by all parties.' However, the Convention does contain guidance on the concept
of disability, providing in Article 1:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical,
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with
various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society
on an equal basis with others.
The Employment Equality Directive does not define any of the protected grounds,
including disability. However, as noted, the difficulties of interpreting this
concept were quickly revealed by the first disability-related preliminary reference
received by the Court of Justice, Chacon Navas. As noted earlier, in that case the
Court, showing none of the hesitation or caution of the drafters of the Convention,
defined disability as:
a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psycho-
logical impairments and which hinders the participation of the person
concerned in professional life.
This definition of disability is very much based on the medical or individual model.
In this respect, EU law is, it is submitted, clearly at odds with the Convention.
However, one should note that the Court's interpretation - definitive as it is for
the time being - is itself not in line with statements and expressions of other EU
institutions. Both the Commission and the Council recognized the need to base
policy on the social model of disability as early as 1996. In July of that year the
Commission adopted a Communication on Equality of Opportunity for People
with Disabilities.' The Communication notes that the way in which society is
organized serves to exclude citizens,"0 and speaks of the evolution towards 'an
1os For comments and proposals submittedby the various parties involved in negotiating
the Convention on the issue of the definition of disability, see Article 2 - Definitions,
Seventh Session, Comments, proposals and amendments submitted electronically,
available at: <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata2sevscomments.
htm> (accessed 28 June 2012). See also, Stefan Tromel, 'A Personal Perspective
on the Drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities', in G. Quinn and L. Waddington (eds.), 1 European Yearbook of
Disability Law, (Intersentia, 2009) 115 at 121 and 122. TrOmel argues that 'Article 1
on the Convention should require the revision of definition of disability/persons with
disabilities in those countries that have more limited definitions.' at 122.
109 Communication of the Commission on Equality of Opportunity for People with
Disabilities of 30 July 1996, COM(96) 406 final.
110 Ibid., para. 2.
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equal opportunities model in the field of disability policy' within the Member
States of the EU."'
In December of the same year, the Council also approved a Resolution on
Equality of Opportunity for People with Disabilities."2 In this document, the
Council, like the Commission, reaffirmed its commitment to the principles and
values of the United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities
for Persons with Disabilities"3 and the principles of equality of opportunity and
eliminating negative discrimination on the sole ground of disability.
The EU institutions have continued to refer regularly to the philosophical
underpinning of disability policy and stress the commitment to the social model
of disability. In 2003, for example, the European Commission reiterated its
commitment to the model by stating:
The EU's long-standing commitment towards its disabled citizens goes
hand in hand with a new approach to disability: from seeing people with
disabilities as the passive recipients of compensation, society has come
to recognise their legitimate demands for equal rights and to realise that
participation relates directly to insertion."
This philosophy is reflected in the 2003 Commission Communication 'Towards a
United Nations legally binding instrument to promote and protect the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities', which stressed that the development of such
a Convention was fully in line with EC disability policy. The Communication
made it clear that the Commission saw non-discrimination and equality as being
the core principles to be embraced by any new Convention."
The ongoing commitment of the EU institutions to the social model of
disability is also reflected in the revised version of a proposal for a new
non-discrimination directive which extends beyond employment and covers
disability, amongst a number of other grounds. This proposal is discussed in more
detail below. For the time being it suffices to note that the European Parliament
proposed inserting text based on Article 1 of the Convention,116 and this was
111 Ibid., para. 20.
112 Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States meeting within the Council of 20 December 1996 on equality of
opportunity for people with disabilities, [1997] OJ C/1.
113 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/46 of 20 December 1993.
114 EU Disability Action Plan (Equal opportunities for people with disabilities: a
European Action Plan, COM(2003) 650 final), 4.
115 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
of 24 January 2003, 'Towards a United Nations legally binding instrument to
promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities', COM(2003)
16 final.
116 European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 April 2009 on the proposal for a
Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)
0426 - C6-0291/2008 - 2008/0140(CNS)), amendment 17. Amendment 3 of the
resolution proposed that the following text be included in the preamble: 'This
Directive is one means by which the Community is complying with its obligations
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taken over and included in the current (amended) proposal for the Directive. The
inserted Recital reads:"
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical,
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which, in interaction with
various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society
on an equal basis with others.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the European Community's original negotiation
position on the Convention was that no definition of disability was needed."
However, following the Court's judgment in Chacon Navas, the Commission, at
the eighth and last negotiating session in New York in August 2006, withdrew
its opposition to the inclusion of guidance on the meaning of the concept of
disability and disabled persons in the Convention."' It is submitted that the
judgment, which generated much criticism from Disabled People's Organizations
(DPOs) and academics within Europe, led the Commission to quietly revise its
opinion of the desirability of including guidance on the concept of disability in
the Convention.
What then are the implications of the CRPD, and Art. 1 in particular, for
interpreting the concept of disability in the Employment Equality Directive and
the Chacon Navas judgment? In its judgment, the Court described its definition
of disability as 'autonomous and uniform'.120 The autonomous nature of the
judgment and related definition is not at issue. However, it is difficult to understand
how the Court's definition of disability could be 'uniform', if that means that it
should be common to all Member States.121 Given that the Directive only sets
under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and should
be interpreted in that light'. Whilst the latest version of the full proposal that has
been made public via the Council's homepage (3 August 2011, 12447/11) retains
a reference to CRPD in preamble Recital 2, the aforementioned Parliamentary
amendment has not been maintained.
117 In Recital 19a. Version of 3 August 2011, (12447/11). At least one (unknown) Member
State has inserted a reservation with regard to this recital.
118 See e.g. Contribution by Governments, European Union, Article 2 Definitions,
EU Position 30 January 2006, available at: <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/
ahc7eu.htm> (accessed 28 June 2012).
119 Information received from participants to the Ad Hoc Committee which negotiated
the Convention.
120 Paras. 40 and 42.
121 An alternative interpretation is that the definition of disability given in the judgment
is 'uniform' in the sense that it should be applied by the Court across all elements
of the directive, meaning that, for example, the same definition of disability should
be used with regard to the prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination, and the
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation. This interpretation would imply
that Member States would remain free to adopt and apply different definitions of
disability in their national legislation, as long as at least the group of people covered
by the definition developed by the Court were covered. However, the Court gave
no indication that this was what it intended, so this element of the judgment is
ambiguous and unclear at the very least.
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minimum requirements, Member States remain free to extend the protection
from discrimination beyond the (personal) scope provided for in the Directive.'22
Moreover, some Member States, such as the UK and Ireland,'23 had, prior to
Court's judgment, developed a definition of disability for the purposes of non-
discrimination law which was (and continues to be) broader than that recognized
by the Court of Justice. Should the Court's judgment be interpreted as requiring,
on occasions, a more restrictive definition of disability in such jurisdictions,
this would seem to clash with the 'non-regression' clause in the Directive,'24
as well as the minimum requirements dimension. In short, the Court's claim in
Chacon Navas that its definition of disability is 'uniform"25 does not seem to be
compatible with the Directive, meaning that Member States remain free to set
higher standards or, in this case, develop a broader definition of disability, for the
purposes of non-discrimination law.
In short, once again, the issue of shared competence may be relevant, with
the Member States being free to go beyond the provisions of the Employment
Equality Directive where this is necessary in order to ensure full compliance
with the Convention. However, one should also note that the Court itself may
choose to revise its definition of disability. The preliminary reference in the cases
of Skouboe Werge and Ring referred to above also offers it this opportunity.
The Danish courts have asked a number of main and sub-questions related to
understanding the concept of disability, and referring back to the Chacon Navas
judgment. In its response, the Court may refer to the CRPD and also pick up on
the implications of the decision of the Commission, Parliament and Council, to
accept the Parliament's amendment to the 2008 Equal Treatment Directive, and
thereby effectively incorporate the CRPD's guidance on the concept of disability
in the proposed Directive.
5.4. PROTECTION FROM DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF
DISABILITY FOR PEOPLE WHO ASSOCIATE WITH A PERSON
WITH A DISABILITY
As noted, the Convention addresses 'all forms of discrimination' 'on the basis of
disability'. It can be argued that the latter phrase emphasizes that discrimination
that is based on disability is prohibited, and not just discrimination against
individuals who actually have a disability.126 In that sense, individuals who
experience discrimination because they associate with a person with a disability
122 Recital 28 provides: 'This Directive lays down minimum requirements, thus giving
the Member States the option of introducing more favourable provisions.
123 See L. Waddington, 'Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA,
judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2006', 44 Common Market Law Review 2
(2007), 487.
124 Also found in Recital 28.
125 If 'uniform' is interpreted to mean a common definition across all Member States.
However, for a suggestion for a possible alternative interpretation of the phrase see
footnote 121.
126 Where the discrimination is on the grounds of disability.
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could also claim protection.12 Nevertheless, the States Parties declined to
specifically include a reference to 'associates' of persons with disability in the
definition of discrimination.128
The Convention seems to adopt a similar approach to the protected ground
as that found in the Employment Equality Directive, as interpreted by the Court
of Justice in the Coleman case. However, the Convention prohibits all forms
of discrimination on the basis of disability, and this includes both indirect
discrimination and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. In contrast,
the Employment Equality Directive only prohibits direct discrimination and
harassment on the ground of disability. Article 5 only confers an entitlement to a
reasonable accommodation on persons with a disability, and this was reiterated
by the Court in Coleman. Whilst the Court did not consider the situation with
regard to indirect discrimination and associates of people with disabilities in
Coleman, a reading of the Directive suggests that it does not protect people who
are associated with someone with a disability from indirect discrimination on
the basis of their association. The Directive defines indirect discrimination as
occurring where 'an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons having ... a particular disability ... at a particular disadvantage compared
with other persons ... '. The definition therefore seems to provide protection from
indirect discrimination only for 'persons having ... a particular disability ...' who
are disadvantaged. As a consequence, it seems difficult to argue that an individual
who is disadvantaged not because they have a disability, but because someone
they associate with has a disability, is protected from indirect discrimination as
a result of this association under EU law. Such protection would only be possible
if, 'persons having ... a particular disability' could be interpreted as including
persons who associate with persons having a particular disability'.
This might reflect a mismatch between the Convention and EU law, with
the latter providing a lower level of protection. However, one should realize
that this argument is highly speculative, since neither the prohibition of indirect
discrimination in the Employment Equality Directive nor the CRPD have been
the subject of authoritative interpretation in this respect. In any case, as was
argued above in the context of reasonable accommodation, the Directive only sets
minimum requirements, and this means that Member States remain free to set
higher standards, and to extend protection from indirect discrimination, and the
duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, to individuals who associate with
a person with a disability. Both forms of discrimination could arise, for example,
in the context of a shift worker who also has caring responsibilities for a disabled
family member or friend.129 That worker may need to provide assistance to a
127 See G. Quinn, 'A Short Guide to the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities', in G. Quinn and L. Waddington (eds.), 1 European
Yearbook ofDisability Law, (Intersentia, 2009), 89 at 102.
128 See Article 2 -Definitions, Seventh Session, Comments, proposals and amendments
submitted electronically, page 23, available at: <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
rights/ahcstata2sevscomments.htm> (accessed 28 June 2012).
129 On reasonable accommodation and carers see also: R. Horton, 'Care-giving and
reasonable adjustment in the UK', in N. Busby and G. James (eds.), Families, Care-
giving and Paid Work, Challenging Labour Law in the 2Ps Century, (Edward Elgar,
2011), 137.
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person with a disability at certain times - typically in the early morning, evening
and night - thereby rendering them unavailable for shift work at these times. A
requirement that such an individual work at these times could be regarded as a
form of indirect discrimination on the grounds of disability, and a duty to provide
a reasonable accommodation to the individual, by allowing them to work on the
day shift whilst their relative or friend receives support from another source,
such as a day centre, could resolve the problem. While the obligation to provide
such protection may not flow from the EU law, one can argue that it is imposed
on those Member States which have ratified the CRPD under international law.
5.5. MATERIAL SCOPE OF THE PROTECTION FROM
DISCRIMINATION
The Convention has a very broad scope, and the duty to prohibit disability
discrimination extends across all fields. In contrast, to date EU disability non-
discrimination law only covers employment and vocational training. The 2008
proposal by the Commission for a new non-discrimination directive addresses
discrimination in areas beyond employment, such as access to goods and services,
healthcare, education, social security, and also covers a number of grounds,
including disability. The proposal also seeks to establish a duty to provide for a
reasonable accommodation in favour of disabled individuals beyond the field of
employment.'30 However, to date this proposal has not been adopted and, given
the strength of the opposition from some Member States to further EU equality
law, this is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 3'
Consequently, there once again exists a (significant) mismatch between the
scope of the Convention and EU law in the field of non-discrimination and equality.
Nevertheless, in light of the fact that combating discrimination is an area of shared
competences, it does not seem possible to argue that there is a legal obligation on
the EU under the Convention to adopt a new directive addressing discrimination
on the ground of disability, and going beyond employment. As noted, in a field
in which competences are shared, strictly speaking it is the Member States that
have the responsibility to comply with the Convention, as long as the EU has not
acted. Any EU action that is taken must be in compliance with the Convention,
but there does not seem to be a legal obligation under international law to act in
fields of shared competence. Therefore, those Member States which have ratified
the Convention now find themselves under an obligation to extend the material
scope of disability non-discrimination law to cover the full range of fields falling
under the CRPD, but this obligation does not extend to the EU itself.
However, I have argued elsewhere'3 2 that it can nevertheless be highly desirable
for the EU to act in such areas of shared competence. Indeed, this is recognized
by the Commission in the case of the proposed Equal Treatment Directive. In its
130 For a discussion of the impact which the CRPD has had on this proposal, see
L. Waddington, 'Future Prospects for EU Equality Law. Lessons to be Learnt from
the Proposed Equal Treatment Directive', European Law Review 2 (2011), 163.
131 Ibid.
132 L. Waddington, 'The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared Competences',
Maastricht Journal ofEuropean and Comparative Law (2011), 431.
Intersentia 197
Lisa Waddington
staff working paper'33 accompanying the proposed Directive, the Commission
wrote:
It should also be recalled that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities will need in any event to be concluded and implemented
by the EC and the Member States. Although there is no obligation to use
EC-level legislation to implement the rights and obligations arising from
the UN Convention, this would be a logical step, ... Through transposing
an EC directive prohibiting disability (sic) the Member States would
implement those parts of the Convention which are included in the
directive, such as the prohibition of discrimination in access to goods
and services, health care, education, as well as the obligation to provide
reasonable accommodation. Such partial implementation of the UN
Convention by EC legislation could help to mitigate the risk of divergent
national implementation measures.
Whilst not explicitly stated, the last sentence, referring to (unspecified) risks
of divergent national CRPD implementation measures in the field of non-
discrimination, clearly hints at the subsidiarity principle. According to this
principle the Union should only take action if the objectives of the action could not
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and the Union can better achieve
the action, because of its scale or effects.'34 In line with the subsidiarity principle,
EU-level action in some CRPD fields in which the EU and the Member States
share competences may be appropriate, both politically and from the perspective
of efficiency - but it is doubtful that there is any obligation on the EU under
international law to act in a field in which it shares competence with the Member
States.'35
6. CONCLUSION
Whilst EU equality law, to the extent that it exists, is generally in line with the
provisions ofthe CRPD, it cannotbe regardedas afull and complete implementation
of the Convention with regard to non-discrimination and equality. Nevertheless,
one should be cautious in concluding that this means that the EU is in breach of its
obligations under the Convention, or that it is obliged to adopt further legislation
in this field. The EU concluded the Convention to the extent of its competences
and, in the field of non-discrimination and equality, those competences are shared
with the Member States. This implies that, as long as EU legislation only sets
minimum requirements with regard to non-discrimination, and as long as those
133 Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Council
Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, Impact
Assessment, Brussels 2 July 2008, SEC(2008) 426 final.
134 Article 5(3), TFEU.
135 In fact, for reasons which are not related to disability or the CRPD, it is highly
unlikely that the EU will adopt this Directive, and negotiations are now stalled. See
L. Waddington, 'Future Prospects for EU Equality Law. Lessons to be Learnt from
the Proposed Equal Treatment Directive', European Law Review 2 (2011), 163.
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requirements do not actively breach the Convention, Member States remain free
to adopt further instruments at the national level where this is necessary to comply
with the obligations they have undertaken under the CRPD. In addition, in line
with Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council considered above, EU law should not
give the Member States the impression that compliance will automatically lead to
full compliance with, and implementation of, the CRPD, when EU law sets lower
standards than those found in the Convention. Consequently, the actions of the
EU and the Member States should be considered in combination when reflecting
on compliance with the Convention.
However, one should also not conclude that the CRPD is irrelevant for EU
non-discrimination and equality law. One can already see that the Convention
has influenced the content of the proposal for a new Equal Treatment Directive.
Whilst that Directive is unlikely to be adopted in the short term, it is clear
that the EU's conclusion of the CRPD has impacted on the proposal, and the
amendments which have subsequently been made to it. The CRPD has also
already been referred to in a number of EU instruments, including the new EU
Disability Strategy 2010-2020.136 Moreover, the Convention is likely to influence
other EU (legislative) initiatives relating (indirectly) to non-discrimination and
equality.13 Therefore, whilst non-discrimination and equality remain an area of
shared competence, this does not mean the Convention is of no significance for
the EU. Indeed, existing practice has already demonstrated that the Commission,
Council and Parliament are taking the Convention into account when preparing
and adopting various initiatives.
Furthermore, the Convention may reinforce the existing obligation on the EU,
found in Article 10 TFEU, to 'combat discrimination based on ... disability' when
defining and implementing its policies and activities. The Convention can provide
a framework within which to interpret this obligation. This framework can be
inspired both by the general obligations of the Convention (Article 4 CRPD)
and by the specific substantive provisions of the Convention. Consequently,
the Convention is of importance for many dimensions of EU policy on non-
discrimination and equality.
136 European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-
Free Europe, COM(2010) 636 final, Brussels, 15.11.2010. One goal of the Strategy is
to identify actions 'needed to implement the UN Convention at EU level' (p. 4).
137 See, for example, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development
Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund
for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the
Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and
repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, Brussels, 6.10.2011 COM(2011) 615 final
2011/0276 (COD), p. 152, which provides, as one of the conditions for receiving
Structural Funds (ex-ante conditionalities), that Member States demonstrate: 'The
existence of a mechanism which ensures effective implementation and application




Following the completion of this article, the Court of Justice of the European Union
handed dow its ruling in Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HKDanmark, acting
on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK Danmark,
acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting
on behalf of Pro Display A/S (Skouboe Werge and Ring) on 11 April 2013. The
Court referred explicitly to the CRPD, and noted that the EU is now a party to the
Convention and that such international agreements are binding on EU institutions
and prevail over acts of the EU.
The Court went on to hold that the Employment Equality Directive precluded
national legislation under which an employer could terminate an employment
contract with a reduced period of notice following the absence of a disabled
work from work, 'where those absences are the consequence of the employer's
failure to take appropriate measures in accordance with the obligation to provide
reasonable accommodation' as provide for in Article 5 of the directive.
With regard to the definition of disability, the Court drew inspiration from
Article 1 CRPD, and held that, for the purposes of the Employment Equality
Directive, the concept of disability must be interpreted as:
including a condition caused by an illness medically diagnosed as curable
or incurable where that illness entails a limitation which results in particular
from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction
with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the
person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers,
and the limitation is a long-term one.
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